RESEARCH ARTICLE
Patent Pools: Intellectual Property Rights and Competition
Victor Rodriguez*
Article Information
Identifiers and Pagination:
Year: 2010Volume: 4
First Page: 62
Last Page: 66
Publisher ID: TOAIDJ-4-62
DOI: 10.2174/1874613601004020062
Article History:
Received Date: 12/4/2009Revision Received Date: 19/4/2009
Acceptance Date: 1/7/2009
Electronic publication date: 19/1/2010

open-access license: This is an open access article licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the work is properly cited.
Abstract
Patent pools do not correct all problems associated with patent thickets. In this respect, patent pools might not stop the outsider problem from striking pools. Moreover, patent pools can be expensive to negotiate, can exclude patent holders with smaller numbers of patents or enable a group of major players to form a cartel that excludes new competitors. For all the above reasons, patent pools are subject to regulatory clearance because they could result in a monopoly. The aim of this article is to present the relationship between patents and competition in a broad context.