Designing ARVs Patent Pool Up to Trade & Policy Evolutionary Dynamics

Daniele Dionisio1, *, Vincenzo Racalbuto2, Daniela Messeri3
1 “Access to Drugs: International Policies” - CLIA (Italian Network for International Fight against AIDS), Italian Society for Infectious and Tropical Diseases (SIMIT), Division of Infectious Diseases, Pistoia Hospital, Pistoia, Italy
2 Italian Cooperation Headquarters at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CLIA, Directorate General for Development Cooperation, Rome, Italy
3 Division of Infectious Diseases, Pistoia Hospital, Pistoia, Italy

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© Dionisio et al.; Licensee Bentham Open.

open-access license: This is an open access article licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License ( which permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the work is properly cited.

* Address correspondence to this author at the Infectious Disease Division, Pistoia Hospital, Piazza Giovanni XXIII 1, Pistoia, Italy; Tel: 0039-0573-352324; Fax: 0039-0573-352309; E-mails:


Patent pools for second and third-line Fixed Dose Combination (FDC) antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) should not be delayed as they are instrumental to urgent public health needs in the under-served markets.

Nonetheless, multinational originator companies still seem to perceive patent pooling for ARVs as a minefield that would offer the generic competitors lots of deeply exploitable opportunities, to the detriment of patent owner’s rights.

This paper analyses the brand industry concerns, while looking for a strategy up to a really equitable and free world market, without any discrimination between end-users in wealthy and resource-limited countries.

This strategy would urge partnerships between originator companies first to make newer FDC ARVs quickly available and allow patent pool agreements with generic counterparts to be negotiated straight afterwards.

The patent pool strategy highlighted in this paper would assert the primacy of health over for-profit policies, while aligning with the 61st WHO’s Assembly recommendations and G7, G8 and World Trade Organisation’s warnings and pledges against trade protectionism.